全球稅務執法聯席會議（J5）國際成員發布了威脅評估，揭露新興技術如何助長包括逃稅在內的全球金融犯罪。

J5 表示，金融科技是破壞稅收執法工作的一個日益重要的途徑。 J5 的成員包括澳洲稅務局、加拿大稅務局、荷蘭財政情報和調查局、英國稅務海關總署以及美國國稅局刑事調查部的高級官員。 J5 警告說，金融科技安排允許在無需銀行直接參與的情況下快速轉移大量逃稅收益，例如使用嵌套服務和虛擬資產來匿名化、隱藏、存儲和轉移非法資金，並將其轉換為法定貨幣或從法定貨幣轉換為法定貨幣。美國稅務訴訟公司 Hochman Salkin Toscher Perez 的 Sandra Brown 和 Philipp Behrendt 表示，這些技術不僅是對傳統逃稅方法的補充，甚至取代它們。

J5 的金融科技報告指出了犯罪者濫用技術實施稅務犯罪的四種主要方法。
 第一種是透過使用嵌套和偽銀行服務，其中嵌入傳統銀行基礎設施的支付服務提供者 (PSP) 和「新銀行」會掩蓋最終帳戶持有人，從而降低監管機構和審計師對交易的可見性。一種流行的變體是使用虛擬銀行帳戶 (VBA)，這些帳戶是偽帳號，可將收到的付款重定向到傳統銀行帳戶，使用戶無需披露其主要帳戶資訊即可收款。金融科技平台和商家通常會使用這些帳戶來掩蓋真實帳戶持有人的身分。同謀的 PSP 可以使用抵銷安排和單獨的支付通道（與多個 PSP 合作）來匿名執行支付交易。
 第二組技術則是基於虛擬資產和假名匿名。加密貨幣、混合器、隱私幣、非託管錢包和跨鏈橋可以促進非法資金的假名存儲和轉移，通常使用“剝離鏈分層”和“混合”等常見工具。剝離鏈分層是指透過一系列快速的自動化交易將大量加密貨幣持有拆分成較小的金額。每次剝離操作都會將一小部分資金發送到新的地址，這使得調查人員更難追蹤資金來源並發現應稅事件。重複的分層操作模仿了合法用戶的行為，並阻礙了區塊鏈分析。混合是指故意將非法資金和合法資金混合，通常使用共享錢包、交易所或混合服務，以掩蓋交易的來源和性質。這種策略有助於隱瞞應稅收入，因為它使乾淨資產和髒資產難以區分，尤其是在與隱私幣或非託管錢包結合使用時。匿名功能（例如混幣器和隱私錢包）被濫用，以阻撓審計追蹤。虛擬資產可以與基於法幣的數位錢包、儲值卡、線上賭博服務，甚至線上遊戲貨幣一起使用。
 第三大類包括法幣的出入通道。加密貨幣 ATM 機、中心化交易所，有時甚至是點對點交易所，允許資金與法幣之間的轉賬，但一旦進入這些服務，區塊鏈上就無法追蹤。這些轉帳不僅速度快，而且無國界，因而削弱了司法監督。
 第四，許多用於儲存未申報收入的新方法應運而生。非同質化代幣 (NFT) 和與美元掛鉤的穩定幣可以成為新時代避稅財富的避風港。這些工具本身並非非法，可用於合法用途。但它們的濫用正在迅速超越監管保障措施，尤其是在反洗錢 (AML) 和「了解你的客戶 (KYC)」框架仍不完善或應用不一致的情況下。一些金融科技實體的反洗錢方案相對不成熟且薄弱，存在將 KYC 措施外包給不受監管的第三方的文化。
一些逃稅服務涵蓋這四種類型，模糊了不同類別之間的界線。例如，穩定幣、加密預付卡以及與虛擬資產掛鉤的借記卡可以發揮雙重功能，並可能被濫用於在數位資產和法定貨幣之間轉換，從而繞過稅務機關追蹤交易的能力。除了方便資金進出外，它們還可能被用來儲存非法或未申報的收入，進一步加劇執法和合規工作的複雜性。

J5 的報告也強調，基於身分的詐欺和基於交易的洗錢是逃稅的重要工具。布朗和貝倫特表示，接受審計的客戶如果使用了 J5 所標記的此類技術，可能會面臨困境，因為這些服務很容易被審計人員誤解，尤其是在交易模式與已知的逃稅類型相似的情況下。 “例如，一位客戶使用剝離鏈模式在多個錢包之間轉移資產，可能出於運營或安全原因，而非為了隱瞞收入，但稅務機關可能會將這些交易解讀為故意分層操作以隱藏資金來源。”

Brown 和 Behrendt 表示，至少自 2023 年年中以來，J5 的網路小組已大幅加強了打擊利用加密貨幣逃稅的行動。美國國稅局及其相關機構已查獲超過 2,500 萬美元的加密資產，並沒收了與各類逃稅和洗錢案件相關的超過 3.33 億美元的資產。他們警告說：“這表明 J5 不再僅限於發出建議性警告。現在，它正在積極瓦解現實世界的加密網絡，利用全球合作夥伴關係追踪匿名交易，並將刑事執法納入國內。”

Tax enforcement chiefs warn of threat from fintech

Members of the international Joint Chiefs of Global Tax Enforcement (J5) have released threat assessments exposing how emerging technologies are facilitating global financial crimes, including tax evasion.

Financial technology is an increasingly important avenue for undermining tax enforcement efforts, says the J5, whose members include senior officials of the Australian Taxation Office, Canada Revenue Agency, Dutch Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service, HM Revenue and Customs and the US Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation Department. It warns that fintech arrangements allow the rapid movement of significant proceeds from tax evasion without direct involvement by banks, such as using nested services and virtual assets to anonymise, conceal, store and transfer illicit funds and convert them to and from fiat currency. These techniques are not just supplementing traditional tax evasion methods but even supplanting them, says Sandra Brown and Philipp Behrendt of US tax litigation firm Hochman Salkin Toscher Perez.

The J5's fintech report identifies four principal methods by which criminals are misusing technology to commit tax crimes.

 The first is through the use of nested and pseudo-banking services, where payment service providers (PSPs) and 'neobanks' embedded within traditional banking infrastructure obscure ultimate account holders, thus reducing transaction visibility for regulators and auditors. A popular variant uses virtual bank accounts (VBAs), which are pseudo-account numbers that redirect incoming payments to a traditional bank account, allowing users to receive funds without disclosing their primary account details. These are often used by fintech platforms and merchants to obscure the identity of the true account holder. Complicit PSPs can use off-setting arrangements and separate payment rails (with multiple PSPs) to execute payment transactions anonymously.
 A second set of techniques is based on virtual assets and pseudo-anonymity. Cryptocurrencies, mixers, privacy coins, unhosted wallets, and cross-chain bridges can facilitate pseudonymous storage and transfer of illicit funds, often with the use of common accessories like 'peel chain layering' and ‘co-mingling’. Peel chain layering involves breaking a large cryptocurrency holding into smaller amounts through a series of rapid, automated transactions. With each peel, a small portion is sent to a new address, making it harder for investigators to trace the origin of the funds and detect a taxable event. The repeated layering mimics legitimate user behaviour and frustrates blockchain analysis. Co-mingling refers to the deliberate mixing of illicit and legitimate funds, often within shared wallets, exchanges or mixing services, to obscure the source and nature of transactions. This tactic helps conceal taxable income by making it difficult to distinguish between clean and dirty assets, especially when combined with privacy coins or unhosted wallets. Anonymity features, such as mixers and privacy wallets, are abused to frustrate audit trails. Virtual assets can be used along with fiat-based digital wallets, stored value cards, online gambling services and even online gaming currencies.
 The third major category includes fiat on- and off-ramps. Crypto ATMs, centralised exchanges, and sometimes even peer-to-peer exchanges allow transfer of funds to or from fiat currency without being traceable on the blockchain once they hit these services. These movements are not only fast but also borderless, thus undermining jurisdictional oversight.
 Fourth, many new methods have been developed for storing undeclared income. Non-fungible tokens (NFTs) and US dollar-pegged stablecoins can serve as new-age safe havens for untaxed wealth. These tools are not inherently illicit and can serve legitimate purposes. But their misuse is rapidly outpacing regulatory safeguards, particularly where anti-money laundering (AML) and know your customer (KYC) frameworks remain underdeveloped or inconsistently applied. Some fintech entities have relatively immature and weak AML programmes, with a culture of outsourcing KYC measures to unregulated third parties.

Some tax evasion services operate across these four typologies, blurring the lines between categories. For example, stablecoins, crypto prepaid cards, and debit cards linked to virtual assets can serve dual functions and can be misused to convert between digital assets and fiat currency, bypassing tax authorities’ ability to trace transactions. In addition to facilitating on- and off-ramping, they can also be used to store illicit or undeclared income, further complicating enforcement and compliance efforts.

The J5 reports also highlight identity-based fraud and trade-based money laundering as important tools for tax evasion. Clients under audit who have used techniques such as those flagged by the J5 could be in a difficult position, as these services can be easily misunderstood by auditors, especially when transaction patterns resemble known tax evasion typologies, say Brown and Behrendt. 'For example, a client who transferred assets through multiple wallets using a peel chain pattern may have done so for operational or security reasons, not to conceal income, but the tax authority may interpret these transactions as deliberate layering to hide the source of funds.'

Since at least mid-2023, the J5's Cyber Group has substantially escalated its campaign against crypto-enabled tax evasion, say Brown and Behrendt. The US IRS and associated bodies have already seized more than USD25 million in crypto assets, resulting in over USD333 million in asset forfeitures connected to various tax evasion and money laundering cases. 'This demonstrates that the J5 is no longer limited to advisory warnings', they warn. 'It is now aggressively dismantling real-world crypto networks, leveraging global partnerships to trace pseudonymous transactions and bring criminal enforcement home'.

Sources：
Taxlitigator
J5 Alliance
J5 (Fintech money laundering report, PDF)